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Abstract: Utilizing various sources of data, this paper describes the evolution of minimum 
wage system in China and analyzes its enforcement. In 2010, 13% of workers in our sample 
earn wages below local minimum wages. This result is worse than most of developed 
countries but better than countries with about the same level of economic development as 
China. Both descriptive statistics and regression analysis indicate that some focused groups of 
workers ought to be targeted when implementing the minimum wages, including female and 
less educated workers. Our analysis further indicates that the effect of compliance in 
minimum wages is not only determined by the effort to enforcement, but also correlated with 
the level of minimum wage, economic structure, ownership type, and labor market conditions, 
etc. Our study also implies that the current minimum wage level in China is in accordance 
with China’s current stage of economic development, and frequent and large increase of 
minimum wage should be restrained. 
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The minimum wage system has been widely accepted in many countries, which makes 
it one of the fundamental pillars of labor market institutions. The original intention to set up 
minimum wage is to intervene the market wage rate at equilibrium, so the institution per se is 
regulative. When looking at the compliance of minimum wage, the leakages exist in almost 
every country, which brings up controversy with the institution in terms of its effectiveness 
and enforcement. Therefore, the policy makers should pay attention to how to design the 
minimum wage system effectively. 
It has been more than two decades since the introduction of minimum wages in China. 
In the past decade, the minimum wage has been influencing the labor market outcomes. The 
existing studies focus on its impacts on employment (Ding, 2010; Ma et al., 2012), working 
time (Jia and Zhang, 2013a), spillover (Luo and Cong, 2009; Jia and Zhang, 2013b), and 
income distribution (Luo, 2011). Concerning the minimum wage per se, however, the policy 
makers should care about whether the minimum wage is effectively enforced and what affects 
the compliance of minimum wages. 
The first message we need to evaluate the implementation of minimum wage is to 
look at the share of workers who earn below the minimum wages. Based on the urban 
household survey data we use in this paper, in 2010 there is 13.26% of workers whose 
monthly wages are less than local minimum wage. The share is 17.26 and 9.84% in 2005 and 
2001 respectively. International comparison indicates that developed countries tend to have 
good performance in compliance of minimum wage. According to a report by Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (2013), in 2012 only 2.6% of workers are reported to work below the federal 
minimum wages in United States. Observation on United Kingdom reveals that 1% of 
workers earn less than minimum wages (Machin et al., 2003). 
In contrast, the situation is much more serious in developing countries where the 
informal employment is ubiquitous. In Brazil, 5-10% of formal employment and 15-30% of 
informal employment are reported wages below minimum wage (Lemos, 2004, 2009). The 
share is about 30% in Honduras (Gindling and Terrell, 2010), 16% in Mexico (Bell, 1997), 
and 24% in Peru (Baanante, 2004). 
In addition to how many, it is also important for labor market regulators to know who 
are not covered by the minimum wage. To target relevant individuals and improve the 
implementation of minimum wages, it would be of policy implications to understand the 
characteristics of those who are not covered by the minimum wage and the job characteristics 
with minimum wage compliance. 
The coverage of minimum wage might be the outcome of implementation, but some 
other factors also have effect on coverage. First of all, the minimum wage per se is related to 
how easy to implement the institution. It is evident that high minimum wage produces large 
targeting groups of worker, which increases the difficulty of enforcement naturally. That is 
why we discuss the evolution of minimum wage in China a little bit. 
Second, the general trend of labor demand and supply affects how easy it would be to 
implement minimum wage. In recent years, driven by demographic change and robust labor 
demand, the shortage of unskilled labor is more and more frequent and the wage rates have 
been going up quickly. According to the NBS, the average monthly earnings for migrant 
workers are RMB 2690 in 2013. It is observed significant trend of wage convergence between 
migrant and local workers (Cai and Du, 2011). In this context, the spontaneous changes in the 
labor market would improve the coverage even without further efforts to enforcing the 
minimum wage. 
Third, the dynamics of economic restructuring, industrial organization and other labor 
market institutions affect the compliance of minimum wage. For instance, it is easy for 
employees in manufacturing to have explicit labor relations with their employers, which 
makes low costs for enforcement. The improvement in other employment institutions affects 
the implementation too. For example, a more regulated Employment Contract Law would 
make enforcement in minimum wages easier; introduction of collective bargaining would 
facilitate monitoring the minimum wages at firm level. 
To understand the compliance of minimum wages in China, various data sources are 
applied to evaluate the changes in minimum wages with international comparison. Using 
micro level data, we analyze the coverage of minimum wage and its determinants. The data 
include the minimum wages at local labor market, cross country data, and the China Urban 
Labor Survey conducted by Institute of Population and Labor Economics in 2001, 2005, and 
2010 respectively. The survey was implemented in Shanghai, Wuhan, Fuzhou, Shenyang and 
Xi’an. Both local residents and migrants are included in the sample, and the sampling strategy 
of proportional probability stratification is applied. The sample is representative at city level. 
The descriptive statistics and regression is weighted by sampling weights to avoid bias. Too 
meet the purpose of this study, only wage employment is included. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the 
minimum wage system in China and discusses the impacts of changing standard on 
implementation. Section 3 looks at the coverage of minimum wage using household survey 
data. Section 4 analyzes the enforcement of minimum wage and its determinants. The final 
section concludes the paper. 
 
II. Minimum Wage Regulation in China 
 
The level of minimum wage is not only the core element of minimum wage regulation, 
but also relates to the enforcement and effects of minimum wage. Although minimum wage 
regulation has a history of almost 20 years in China, it is still not very clear at what level 
should minimum wage be set, and what factors should be taken into consideration when 
adjusting minimum wage. These ambiguities have resulted in casualness in setting minimum 
wage and increased difficulties in minimum wage enforcement. In this section, we will first 
review the evolution of minimum wage regulation in China, and then discuss the level and 
adjustment of minimum wage as well as their relationship with minimum wage enforcement. 
 
2.1 Evolution of Minimum Wage Regulation in China 
 
China officially recognized the Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention in 
1984
①
. However, from 1984 to 1992, there was simply no official minimum wage in China. In 
1993, the Chinese Government issued its first minimum wage regulation, the Enterprise 
Minimum Wage Regulation. This regulation stipulates that a minimum wage can only be 
modified after it has been effective for at least one year. This regulation requires that local 
governments set the minimum wage according to local average wage, productivity, 
unemployment rate, economic development and minimum living expenses, and all enterprises 
should comply with this regulation. These conditions provide considerable flexibility for 
provinces and cities in setting their minimum wages, with the economic development 
principle giving them the flexibility to restrain minimum wages to attract foreign investment 
(Wang and Gunderson, 2011). Minimum wage regulation was formally established in 1995 
when the Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China was set into force. As a result, most 
provinces in China announced their first monthly minimum wages around 1995. 
In the end of 2004, temporary labor shortages in some developed areas caught the 
attention of policy-makers. In the same year, a modified minimum wage regulation, the 
Minimum Wage Regulation, was adopted. According to this new regulation, minimum wage 
should be adjusted at least once every two years. This is a big improvement over the 1993 
regulation. Employers should not include subsidies, such as overtime pay, as part of the wage, 
when calculating the minimum wage. Penalties for violation of the regulation were increased 
                                                        
①
 The Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention was established in 1928 by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO). 
from 20-100 percent of the owed wage to 100-500 percent. A minimum wage per hour that 
applies to part-time workers was also stipulated in this updated regulation. 
Minimum wage regulation was also part of the Labor Contract Law which took effect 
on May 1st, 2008. However, at the end of 2008, the Department of Human Resources and 
Social Security of China advised local governments against increasing minimum wage in 
2009 in case of possible negative impacts of the international financial crisis. As the influence 
of the financial crisis waned, there was a new round of minimum wage increases from 2010. 
In 2010, 30 of 31 provinces increased their minimum wages, with the average increase at 23 
percent
①
. In each of 2011, 2012 and 2013, 24 provinces increased their minimum wages, and 
the average increase in each year was around 20 percent
②
. The Chinese Government has also 
promised to continue this increase in its twelfth five-year plan. In a recent proposal by the 
National Development and Reform Commission, the Chinese Government has set the goal 
that by the end of 2015, minimum wage should reach to 40 percent of average wage of urban 
employment persons. It is apparent that China has entered an era of frequent minimum wage 
adjustments. 
 
2.2 The Level of Minimum Wage in China 
 
Unlike many developed economies, China does not set up universal national minimum 
wage, while the provincial governments are responsible for minimum wage adjustments in 
each province. According to the Minimum Wage Regulation of 2004, multiple minimum 
wages are allowed in the same province. Therefore, to obtain a basic understanding of how 
the minimum wage standard has been set and increased in China, in this section, we use a 
two-step weighted approach to calculate the national minimum wage in each year. First, we 
calculate the average minimum wage in each province in each year using the actual 
enforcement days of each minimum wage as the weight. Second, we calculate the average 
national minimum wage using urban employment of each province as the weight. 
In Figure 1, we present minimum wage changes in China from 1995 to 2013
③
. It is 
evident that both nominal and real minimum wages have been increasing since 1995. 
However, if we measure minimum wage by relative minimum wage (the ratio of minimum 
wage to average wage, referred to as relative minimum wage hereafter), we will find that 
minimum wage in China have been decreasing in recent years. Compared with OECD 
countries, minimum wage in China is still at a relatively low level. As of 2012, the relative 





                                                        
①
 This value is calculated by the author based on the China Minimum Wage Database. 
②
 This value is calculated by the author based on the China Minimum Wage Database. In 2013, only 
minimum wage adjustments in the last three quarters were considered. 
③
 Although minimum wage regulation was first introduced in 1993, most provinces issued their first 
minimum wages in 1995. That is why we do not report a national minimum wage before 1995 in 
Figure 1. 
④
 According to the China Minimum Wage Database, the annual minimum wage in 2012 was 11438 
yuan. According to the China Statistical Yearbook 2013, the annual average wage of urban employees 
in 2012 was 46769 yuan. As a result, the relative minimum wage is 24 percent for 2012. 
 
Figure 1 Minimum Wage Increase in China, 1995-2013 
Source: China Minimum Wage Database, available from http://www.chinaminimumwage.org. 
Note: Nominal minimum wage is adjusted by CPI to calculate real minimum wage, using 1995 as 
the base year. 
 
Due to the lack of long-term data on average wage from labor force surveys, we used 
the average wage data published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) when 
calculating the relative minimum wage. However, as pointed out by Du and Wang (2008), the 
average annual wage published by NBS is based on a labor survey in urban China, and 
migrant workers and workers in informal sectors, who generally earn less than the average 
wage, are not fully represented in the sample. As a result, the official average wage is 
overestimated, while the relative minimum wage is underestimated. 
In fact, if we calculate the relative minimum wage using the average wage from a 
well-represented sample, we will find that minimum wage in China is already at a relatively 
high level (see Figure 2)
①
. The relative minimum wage in China has already reached the 
target set by the National Development and Reform Commission of China. 
 
                                                        
①
 For Figure 3, the average wage is calculated from the China Urban Labor Survey, which was 
conducted by the Institute of Population and Labor Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
in 2001, 2005 and 2010. For more details of the survey, please visit http://iple.cass.cn/cate/1103.htm. 
 
Figure 2 Relative Minimum Wage: 2001, 2005 and 2010 
Source: The average and median wages are from the three waves of China Urban Labor Survey 
(CULS). The minimum wage data is from the China Minimum Wage Database (CMWD), available 
from http://www.chinaminimumwage.org. 
 
For international comparisons, we also collect the latest minimum wage data for 150 
countries and calculate the level of minimum wage relative to per capita GDP (see Table 1 
and Figure 3). From an international perspective, the relative minimum wage and per capita 
GDP are negatively correlated: high income countries have a low relative minimum wage, 
while in low income countries, the necessary costs of basic living (a proxy for minimum wage) 
account for a large proportion of per capita GDP. 
Table 1 Relative Minimum Wage and Per Capita GDP (by the End of 2013) 
Income Group Relative Minimum Wage (%) 
Low income countries 104.76 
Lower middle income countries  64.78 
China 38.90 
Upper middle income countries  39.83 
High income countries: Non-OECD 28.19 
High income countries: OECD 39.31 
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_minimum_wages_by_country 
Note: Relative minimum wage is calculated using the latest available data for each country. China 
belongs to the upper middle-income countries. 
 
 
Figure 3 The Relationship between Minimum Wage and Per Capita GDP 
Source: Per capita GDP is from the World Development Indicator (WDI) database by the World 
Bank. The 2012 data is used here. The latest available minimum wage is from Wikipedia entry “List of 
Minimum Wages by Country” (available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_minimum_wages_ 
by_country). 
Note: Both minimum wage and per capita GDP have been adjusted by purchasing power parity 
(PPP), published by the World Bank. 
 
As is evident from Figure 3, China is exactly on the fitted curve. If the relationship 
between the relative minimum wage and per capita GDP is universal, the minimum wage 
increase in China should not exceed the increase in per capita GDP over the next few years or 
even longer term. However, it is obvious that, as evidenced by Figure 4, the minimum wage 
increase in China has greatly exceeded the increase of per capita GDP in recent years. 
 
 
Figure 4 The Increase of Minimum Wage and Per Capita GDP in China 
Source: Minimum wage data is from the China Minimum Wage Database (available from 
http://www.chinaminimumwage.org); per capita GDP is obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook 
2013. 
Note: All the data have been adjusted by GDP deflator. 
 
As described above, if we consider the relationship between minimum wage and the 
stage of economic development, minimum wage in China is already very high, in terms of 
both absolute level and international comparisons. In the current context of economic 
slowdown, especially when provincial governments tend to use minimum wage as a tool of 
income redistribution, continued large increase of minimum wage may became an important 
factor of pushing higher labor cost. If minimum wage in China continues to increase at 20 
percent in the next few years, it may also generate great pressure on economic growth. 
 
2.3 Monthly or Hourly Minimum Wage? 
 
From an international perspective, most developed countries, for example, United States, 
United Kingdom and Canada, only adopt hourly minimum wage. In China, according to the 
Minimum Wage Regulation of 2004, there are two kinds of minimum wages: monthly 
minimum wage and hourly minimum wage. Monthly minimum wage applies to full-time 
workers, while hourly minimum wage applies to part-time workers. Adopting two types of 
minimum wages have considered the general tradition of paying wages in China, and the 
proper protection of part-time workers. However, although there are clear regulations on how 
monthly minimum wage and hourly minimum wage can be transformed into each other, there 
are still some problems in actual enforcement of two minimum wages. 
First, some provincial governments didn’t pay much attention to hourly minimum wage. 
Taking the five cities in CULS as an example, all cities including Shanghai, Wuhan, 
Shenyang, Fuzhou and Xi’an greatly increased monthly minimum wage between 2001 and 
2005, and between 2005 and 2010 (see Table 2). However, although the Minimum Wage 
Regulation requested local governments to set up hourly minimum wage in 2004, some cities 
like Xi’an didn’t publish hourly minimum wage even in 2005
①
. Besides, enforcing monthly 
minimum wage needs to monitor both working time and monthly wage, and enforcing hourly 
minimum wage needs to distinguish between part-time and full-time jobs. These can all 
increase the difficulties and complexities of minimum wage enforcement. 
 
Table 2 Minimum Wage during the Three Waves of CULS 
City 
Monthly Minimum Wage (Yuan/Month) Hourly Minimum Wage (Yuan/Hour) 
2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 
Shanghai 490 690 1120 4.00 6.00 9.00 
Wuhan 260 460 900 - 5.00 9.00 
Shenyang 380 450 900 - 4.00 8.50 
                                                        
①
 Some provinces have been publishing hourly minimum wages since 1995, when the Enterprise 
Minimum Wage Regulation was first introduced. However, this hourly minimum wage is calculated 
directly from monthly minimum wage (a typical worker generally works four weeks per month and 
20.92 hours per week), and is very different from hourly minimum wage that applies to part-time 
workers. After the Minimum Wage Regulation of 2004 was set into force, most provinces stopped 
publishing calculated hourly minimum wage. 
Fuzhou 380 470 800 - 4.54 8.50 
Xi’an 320 490 760 - - 7.60 
Note: Monthly minimum wage applies to full-time workers, while hourly minimum wage applies 
to part-time workers. “-” means no hourly minimum wage at the time of survey. 
 
Second, adopting a monthly minimum wage in China will induce firm to take 
advantage of the current wage system by increasing workings hours when maximum working 
hour regulation are not well monitored by governments. Jia and Zhang (2013a) find that 
minimum wage adjustment can increase male weekly working hours, although male 
employment is not affected. 
Third, minimum wage workers generally have less human capital and bargaining 
power in labor market, and they generally need to work longer hours than non-minimum 
wage workers. The CULS data indicate that there are obvious differences in weekly working 
hours among different labor forces (see Table 3). Migrant workers generally have to work 
longer hours than local workers. Workers with low educational attainment generally have to 
work longer hours than workers with relatively high educational attainment. If working hour 
is not well monitored by governments, enforcing monthly minimum wage will probably 
sacrifice the interests of migrant and less-educated workers, whom minimum wage regulation 
needs to protect in the first place. 
 












2001 46.69 41.12 46.51 42.43 41.44 40.67 
2005 45.02 41.11 43.91 43.14 41.11 40.04 
2010 43.21 40.91 44.20 42.49 41.11 40.31 
Source: Authors’ computation based on CULS data. 
 
Finally, part-time workers only account for a small proportion of total urban 
employment. According to the Labor Contract Law, “part-time labor” means a form of labor 
for which the compensation is chiefly calculated by the hour and where the employee 
generally averages not more than 4 hours of work per day and not more than an aggregate 24 
hours of work per week for the same employer. According to this definition and CULS data, 
hourly minimum wage only applies to 2% of total employment. 
As can be inferred from above analysis, to target the minimum wage workers more 
effectively and decrease the enforcing difficulties, the Chinese Government should try 
publishing only an hourly minimum wage, which applies to both full-time and part-time 
workers. 
 
III. The Coverage of Minimum Wage 
 
The very basic information we need to evaluate the enforcement is to look at how 
many workers are earning below local minimum wages. According to the Minimum Wage 
Regulation enacted in 2004, both monthly and hourly rates are adopted where the former is 
applied to full time worker and the latter to part time jobs. The Article 2 of Employment 
Contract Law defines full time job. Based on this definition, we distinguish every job we get 




The demographic determines wages. For the sake of enforcement, the linkages 
between demographics and wage give explicit message of who are easily to fall below 
minimum wage. Based on the three rounds of household survey, Table 4 presents the 
compliance of minimum wage by gender, education, and age. 
Without controlling for other factors, Table 4 indicates that the average wages for 
female is significantly lower than male. In 2001 average monthly earnings for female are 
about 78.3% of those of male, and the ratio went up to 80.9% in 2010. Measured by hourly 
wages, the ratios are 79.9%, 82.0%, and 82.9% in 2001, 2005, and 2010 respectively. The 
women are more likely to earn less than minimum wage since their wages are lower than 
male workers. In 2001 female workers who earn earnings below minimum wage are 5.7 
percentage points higher than their male counterpart, and the shares are 7.8 and 6.1 
percentage points higher in 2005 and 2010 respectively. This significant difference reflects 
possible existence of labor market discrimination. More importantly, it provides targeting 
groups to enforce the minimum wage. 
The less educated workers are always the major targeting groups for minimum wage. 
Our sample also indicates significant difference of coverage among workers with different 
education. Samples from the three rounds of survey all indicate trend of increasing wage with 
education. When compared by hourly rates, the more educated workers tend to have more 
advantages. For example, in 2010 average monthly wage rate for workers with primary 
education or less is 47.9% of that of workers with college or above. Measured by hourly 
wages, the former is 41% of the latter. It is obvious that less educated workers are more likely 
to earn wage below minimum wage. Table 4 indicates that, despite of the coverage variations 
due to adjustment of minimum wages over time, the group of workers with least education is 
most likely to fall below minimum wage. In 2010, 32.5% of workers with primary school or 
below earn below local minimum wages. For workers with junior high school, the share is 
23.8%. 
The compliance of minimum wage is also associated with the wage changes over life 
cycle. As indicated in Table 4, the coverage of minimum wage shows an inverted U shape 
with age increase. It is worthwhile to note the coverage for two age groups. The first one is 
the new labor market entrants whose ages are between 16 and 20. Both their average wage 
rates and coverage rate are low. In 2010, 18.8 of workers in the group earn wage rate below 
minimum wage. The other interesting group is those aged 50 or above. Although the average 
wage is not the lowest among groups, they have large wage variations within group, as 
evidenced by high standard deviations in the parenthesis. As a result, we still see a relatively 
large share of this group of workers earn below minimum wage. 
 
Table 4 Compliance of Minimum Wage by Demographic 
 
Monthly Rate Hourly Rate Coverage (%) 
2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 
Gender 
Male 
1078 1411 2488 6.42 8.39 14.83 93.1 89.1 91.2 
(874) (1192) (2049) (5.83) (7.74) (12.8) (25.4) (31.1) (28.3) 
Female 
844 1109 2012 5.13 6.88 12.29 87.4 81.3 85.1 




664 721 1414 3.40 4.02 7.46 75.9 54.9 67.5 
(452) (344) (782) (2.26) (2.50) (4.32) (42.9) (49.8) (46.9) 
Jr. High 
760 900 1620 4.41 5.21 9.12 85.3 74.0 76.2 
(413) (591) (920) (2.71) (3.94) (5.46) (35.4) (43.9) (42.6) 
Sr. High 
943 1184 2000 5.63 7.09 11.99 92.5 88.0 88.0 
(761) (815) (1872) (4.75) (5.27) (11.8) (26.3) (32.5) (32.5) 
College and 
Above 
1404 1875 2954 8.77 11.69 18.21 97.9 96.0 96.9 
(1006) (1613) (1984) (7.14) (10.4) (12.9) (14.2) (19.5) (17.3) 
Age 
16-20 
673 898 1378 3.18 5.09 6.82 83.6 87.0 81.2 
(347) (369) (629) (2.17) (2.85) (3.45) (37.2) (33.7) (39.2) 
21-30 
1080 1484 2401 6.13 8.88 14.61 94.6 93.3 93.9 
(806) (1181) (1841) (5.14) (7.67) (12.6) (22.6) (25.0) (24.0) 
31-40 
957 1175 2525 5.67 6.93 15.11 92.3 83.7 93.2 
(683) (1104) (1836) (4.59) (7.20) (11.4) (26.7) (36.9) (25.3) 
41-50 
910 1203 1967 5.52 7.24 11.63 89.6 82.1 83.2 
(661) (1060) (1364) (4.14) (6.71) (8.37) (30.5) (38.4) (37.4) 
50+ 
1070 1389 2304 6.83 8.79 14.18 87.3 87.0 82.8 
(1012) (1107) (2394) (7.23) (7.49) (15.1) (33.3) (33.7) (37.7) 
Source: Authors’ computation based on CULS data. 




Rural migrant workers have been the indispensible component of labor supply in 
urban labor market. According to the NBS, in 2013 the rural migrant workers totaled 166 
million, which accounted for 40 per cent of urban employment. With labor market 
development, hukou has disconnected with employment determination and wage formation 
gradually, even its link with social protection is still obvious. 
Table 5 presents the same indicators as Table 4, but by hukou status. In 2001 and 2005, 
local workers have higher average wages. However, with the increasing labor scarcity, wage 
rates for migrant workers have been growing rapidly. In 2010, wages for migrant workers are 
slightly higher than their local counterpart in our sample. This is consistent with observations 
from aggregated information. According the NBS, real wage growth per annum for migrant 
workers is 12.7% between 2007 and 2013, much faster than urban local workers. It is good to 
believe that the spontaneous changes in labor demand and supply facilitate the compliance of 
minimum wage in this case even without additional effort to enforcement. 
Table 5 Coverage of Minimum Wage: Local Workers and Migrants 
Year Local Workers Migrant Workers 
Monthly Wages (RMB, Yuan) 
2001 986 (775) 934 (745) 
2005 1298 (1120) 1086 (844) 
2010 2280 (1858) 2304 (1605) 
Hourly Wages (RMB, Yuan) 
2001 6.05 (5.17) 4.57 (4.78) 
2005 7.91(7.27) 5.66 (5.26) 
2010 13.86 (11.90) 12.61 (10.10) 
Coverage (%) 
2001 91.1 (28.5) 87.7 (32.8) 
2005 86.3 (34.4) 79.1 (40.7) 
2010 88.5 (32.0) 89.4 (30.8) 
Source: Authors’ computation based on CULS data. 
Note: The standard deviations are in parenthesis. 
 
The results in Table 5 indicate that local workers have better compliance in the case of 
2001 and 2005. However, the share of local workers falling below minimum wage in 2010 is 
0.9 percentage point higher than migrant workers. It has something to do with the labor 
market dynamics, which improves the situations of migrant workers. The result is also 
associated with insufficient social protection of migrant workers. Figure 5 depicts the 
compliance of minimum wages and coverage of social protection for both migrant workers 
and local workers as well. The left panel reflects the workers working below minimum wages 
and the right panel for the above. 
Two features of Figure 5 are worth noting. First of all, regardless of compliance of 
minimum wage, the coverage of social protection for local workers is much higher than 
migrant workers. Second, as far as workers working below minimum wages are concerned, 
there is even more significant disparity between migrant workers and their local counterpart. 
 
 
  (a) minimum wage worker     (b) non-minimum wage worker 
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migrant workers local workers
Source: authors’ computation based on CULS data. 
Note: “UI” stands for unemployment insurance, while “WI” stands for injury insurance. 
 
Sector, Occupation, and Ownership 
 
It is of policy relevance to observe the compliance by ownership or sector. The 
ownership, occupation, and sectors reflect the job characteristics that are associated with how 
difficult to enforce minimum wage. Table 6 lists the compliance of minimum wage by the 
three dimensions respectively. 
For simplicity the subsectors are regrouped into four groups as consumer services, 
business services, manufacturing, and other secondary industries. The consumer services 
include wholesale and retail, education, culture, entertainment and sports, and general 
services. The business services include production and supply of electricity, heat, gas, and 
water, transportation and logistics, software and IT, finance, construction, real estate, R & D. 
Both consumer services and manufacturing are characterized by intensively using labor, as 
evidenced by low hourly wage rates. 
Greater variations in wage distribution are found in the sectors of consumer service. 
For example, the coefficients of variation in the sector for monthly and hourly rates are 0.75 
and 0.87 respectively while the coefficient is 0.63 in manufacturing. So, the disparity in 
average wage is small, but the compliance with minimum wage in consumer service is 10 
percentage points below. Thus it can be seen that the performance of minimum wage 
enforcement has something to do with the industrial organization. In other words, when one 
city is dominated by manufacturing and another is dominated by consumer service, the 
outcomes could be different even the local governments take the same effort to enforcement. 
It seems that the types of ownership make difference in compliance too. The 
employers are grouped as public administration, SOEs, and private sectors. Workers in SOEs 
have similar average wages to those in private sector; however, the latter has worse 
compliance in minimum wage. In 2010, the share of workers earning below minimum wages 
are 6.2 percentage point higher in private sectors than in public sectors. 
 
Table 6 Compliance of Minimum Wages by Sector, Occupation, and Ownership 
 
Monthly Rate Hourly Rate Coverage (%) 




978 1126 2016 5.68 6.73 12.19 89.3 81.4 81.4 
(688) (818) (1518) (4.86) (5.31) (10.6) (31.0) (38.9) (38.9) 
Business 
Service 
1142 1677 2694 6.85 10.17 16.09 95.9 94.0 95.0 
(1077) (1509) (2381) (7.14) (9.85) (14.8) (19.8) (23.8) (21.9) 
Manufacture 
847 1190 2093 5.16 7.10 12.59 88.9 90.0 91.2 
(617) (932) (1321) (3.92) (5.91) (7.94) (31.4) (30.0) (28.4) 
Others 
987 1312 2458 6.18 8.27 15.01 89.4 80.6 93.9 
(659) (1249) (1649) (4.30) (8.24) (9.70) (31.0) (39.6) (24.1) 
Ownership 
Public 1066 1454 2693 6.64 9.01 16.96 89.4 89.8 91.2 
Admin. (878) (1133) (2244) (6.20) (7.20) (14.9) (30.8) (30.2) (28.4) 
SOEs 
898 1264 2147 5.50 7.65 13.09 91.2 90.2 91.0 
(614) (972) (1528) (3.92) (6.27) (9.57) (28.4) (29.7) (28.7) 
Private 
1058 1178 2167 5.77 6.90 12.44 91.3 78.9 84.8 




- 2010 3623 - 12.42 21.52 - 98.1 96.5 
- (1598) (3217) - (10.2) (20.3) - (13.6) (18.4) 
Professionals 
- 1769 2924 - 11.13 18.22 - 97.4 97.0 
- (1449) (1864) - (9.50) (12.3) - (15.8) (17.1) 
Clerk 
- 1251 2688 - 7.92 16.58 - 85.7 94.1 
- (998) (2444) - (6.85) (15.3) - (35.1) (23.6) 
Attendants 
- 1000 1770 - 5.83 10.24 - 73.8 75.9 
- (888) (1520) - (5.63) (9.64) - (44.0) (42.8) 
Production 
Workers 
- 1153 1935 - 6.66 11.46 - 92.3 90.2 
- (712) (1093) - (4.40) (6.86) - (26.6) (29.8) 
Source: Authors’ computation based on CULS data. 




The informal sectors are always key targeting areas to enforce minimum wages. The 
informal employee is defined as the employees without employment contract or workers who 
worked in enterprises with less than seven employees. The findings from the three waves of 
data are indicated in Table 7. 
First, it is not surprising that significant disparity in compliance of minimum wages 
exists between formal and informal sectors. In 2010, the compliance in formal sectors is 17.7 
percentage points higher than that in informal sectors. Second, with increasing minimum 
wages over time, the compliance in informal sectors has been deteriorating. The coverage rate 
in 2010 has fallen 3.9 percentage points from 2001. Third, more heterogeneity is found within 
formal sectors over time. For instance, the coefficient of variation for monthly wages in 
informal sector has been going up from 0.64 in 2001 to 0.82 in 2010. The result is consistent 
with observations in other countries where the informality diversifies with economic 
development (Andrews et al., 2011). The heterogeneity within informal sectors has been 
challenging with the enforcement of minimum wage in terms of necessity and difficulties. On 
the one hand, with economic development, some workers might voluntarily choose informal 
job, which brings up the necessity to intervene the wage through institution. On the other 
hand, the heterogeneity of informal employment in job characteristics and job quality makes 
it more difficult to identify what to enforce in formal sector, which increases the costs of 
enforcement. 
 
Table 7 The Compliance of Minimum Wages by Informality 
 
Monthly Rate Hourly Rate Coverage (%) 
2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 
Formal 
1010 1465 2358 6.09 8.97 14.3 92.1 91.7 90.2 
(790) (1218) (1865) (5.17) (7.87) (12.0) (27.0) (27.6) (29.8) 
CV 0.78 0.83 0.79 0.85 0.88 0.84 0.29 0.30 0.33 
Informal 
667 885 1526 3.58 5.09 8.06 76.4 72.8 72.5 
(427) (636) (1250) (4.34) (4.24) (6.98) (42.5) (44.5) (44.7) 
CV 0.64 0.72 0.82 1.21 0.83 0.87 0.56 0.61 0.62 
Source: Authors’ computation based on CULS data. 
Note: The standard deviations are in parenthesis. CV is short for “coefficient of variation”. 
 
IV. Determinants of Minimum Wage Enforcement 
 
In section 3, we observe that there are huge differences in minimum wage coverage 
among different labor forces. In this section, we will use micro data from the three waves of 




The minimum wage data used in this section is from the China Minimum Wage 
Database (CMWD), which is available from http://www.chinaminimumwage.org). This 
database is established by the Institute of Population and Labor Economics, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences. The database contains minimum wage and other labor market indicators of 
nearly 3000 county-level regions in China from 1993 to the present day. 
The micro-level data used in this section is from China Urban Labor Survey (CULS), 
which was conducted in 2001, 2005 and 2010 by the Institute of Population and Labor 
Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In the 2001 survey (CULS 1), five cities, 
Shanghai, Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou and Xi’an, were sampled. In each city, we interviewed 
700 urban households and 600 migrant workers in 70 communities, based on multi-stage 
random sampling principle. In the 2005 survey (CULS 2), another seven cities, Wuxi, 
Yichang, Benxi, Zhuhai, Shenzhen, Baoji and Daqing, were sampled, besides the five cities in 
CULS 1. We interviewed 500 urban households and 500 migrant households in each city 
based on the same sampling principle. In 2010 (CULS 3), Guangzhou was added to the survey, 
besides the five cities in CULS 1. In each city, following the same sampling principle, we 
interviewed 700 urban households and 600 migrant households. 
In this section, to maintain consistency across surveys, we only use data of Shanghai, 
Wuhan, Shenyang, Fuzhou and Xi’an, which were sampled in all three rounds. Also, because 
minimum wage regulation only applies to employees in firms and public institutions, we 
delete observations whose employment status is employer or self-employment. Besides, 
according to the definition of “part-time worker” in Labor Contract Law, we also distinguish 




In our model, the explained variable is a dummy variable, i.e. whether one’s wage is 
below the official minimum wage (1 for below or equal to minimum wage, 0 for above 
minimum wage). The explained variable is highly related to wage, so the right-hand of the 
model include variables that should appear in a typical wage equation. These variables can be 
classified into three categories: individual demographic and human capital variables, 
household-level variables, regional and firm-level variables. 
Individual demographic and human capital variables include workers’ gender (dummy 
variable, 0 for female), age, age squared, education in years, training (dummy variable, 0 for 
no training), and health condition (discrete variable, with 1 to 4 standing for bad, general, 
good and very good health condition respectively, using “bad” as the base), etc. 
Household-level variables include workers’ marital status (dummy variable, 0 for 
unmarried), number of household members, whether there are children below 6 in the 
household (dummy variable, 0 for no children below 6), etc. 
Regional and firm-level variables include whether the worker holds a local hukou 
(dummy variable, 0 for non-local hukou), city (discrete variable, using Shanghai as the base), 
industry (discrete variable, using manufacturing as the base; the definitions of production 
services and consumer services are the same with section 3), types of ownership (dummy 
variable, using public sector as the base), and the interaction terms of some variables, etc. 
A linear probability model is applied in our analysis. As pointed out by Wooldridge 
(2010), if the purpose of the research is to study the marginal effects of the explanatory 
variables, and if most of the explanatory variables only take a few unique values, then the use 
of a linear probability model is much better, and the problem that some predicted value may 
fall outside the range [0, 1] should not be concerned. Besides, compared with Probit model, it 
is straightforward to explain the coefficients of a linear probability model. As a result, in this 
section, we apply a linear probability model in all regressions. 
 
4.3 Regression Results 
 
Table 8 presents the regression results of determinants of minimum wage enforcement 
under three different specifications. In specification (1), the explanatory variables include the 
city dummies, the industry dummies, and the ownership dummies, but don’t include the 
interaction terms of them. In specification (2), the explanatory variables include the 
interaction terms of these dummy variables, but don’t include the variables separately. In 
specification (3), the explanatory variables include both the dummy variables and their 
interaction terms. 
After controlling other factors, minimum wage coverage for female is still worth than 
male in all three specifications. This may be partially caused by the fact that female average 
wage is lower than male. This may also reflect discrimination again female in labor market, 
and minimum wage protection for female is not enough. In 2005, the coefficients of age and 
age squared imply an inverse U relationship between minimum wage coverage and age, i.e. 
younger and older individuals tend to be less likely covered by minimum wage, which is 
consistent with our analysis in section 3. 
More education tends to decrease the possibility that one’s wage will fall below the 
minimum wage. The contribution of training to wage determination is becoming more and 
more important in recent years. Better health conditions have positive impact on wage. 
Education, training and health condition are all core elements of human capital, and they all 
contribute positively to wage, which is consistent with human capital theory. 
In all three specifications, household-level variables generally have trivial effects on 
wage. However, married individuals with children have greater responsibilities for their 
families. As a result, they generally have to work much harder and hold a more stable job, and 
may be less likely to fall below the minimum wage. 
 
Table 8 Determinants of Minimum Wage Coverage 
Explanatory Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 
Gender -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
Age -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 0.01** -0.00 
Age Squared 0.00 -0.01* 0.01* 0.00 -0.01* 0.01* 0.00 -0.01* 0.01* 
Education -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 
Training -0.01 0.06** -0.05*** -0.01 0.04 -0.05*** -0.01 0.04 -0.05*** 
Health: General -0.11*** -0.27*** -0.17** -0.11*** -0.27*** -0.16* -0.11*** -0.27*** -0.16* 
Health: Good -0.12*** -0.32*** -0.24*** -0.12*** -0.30*** -0.23*** -0.12*** -0.30*** -0.23*** 
Health: Very Good -0.13*** -0.35*** -0.25*** -0.14*** -0.33*** -0.23*** -0.14*** -0.33*** -0.23*** 
Marital Status -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
No. of Household Members 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Children Below 6 in the Family -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Local Labor -0.04* -0.02 0.04*** -0.04** -0.05* 0.03** -0.04** -0.05* 0.03** 
City: Wuhan -0.05*** 0.15*** 0.06***    -0.04 0.08** -0.01 
City: Shenyang 0.04** 0.12*** 0.08***    0.11*** 0.17*** 0.05 
City: Fuzhou 0.00 -0.02 0.01    0.13*** 0.16** -0.02 
City: Xi’an 0.03** 0.05*** -0.00    0.02 0.06** -0.00 
Industry: Production Service -0.04*** 0.00 -0.01    -0.07*** 0.04 -0.02 
Industry: Consumer Service 0.00 0.07*** 0.09***    0.04 0.08*** 0.08** 
Industry: Other Industries 0.01 0.10*** -0.01    0.02 0.06* 0.03 
Private Sector -0.03* 0.07*** 0.04***    -0.02 0.04 0.05 
Shanghai * Manufacturing * Private Sector    -0.02 0.04 0.05    
Shanghai * Production Service * Public Sector    -0.07*** 0.04 -0.02    
Shanghai * Production Service * Private Sector    0.03 0.06** 0.01 0.12** -0.01 -0.01 
Shanghai * Consumer Service * Public Sector    0.04 0.08*** 0.08**    
Shanghai * Consumer Service * Private Sector    -0.02 0.06* 0.07* -0.04 -0.06 -0.06 
Shanghai * Other Industries * Public Sector    0.02 0.06* 0.03    
Shanghai * Other Industries * Private Sector    -0.01 0.25** -0.13** -0.00 0.15 -0.21*** 
Wuhan * Manufacturing * Public Sector    -0.04 0.08** -0.01    
Wuhan * Manufacturing * Private Sector    -0.09*** 0.28*** 0.10 -0.03 0.16* 0.06 
Wuhan * Production Service * Public Sector    -0.06*** 0.09* -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.02 
Wuhan * Production Service * Private Sector    -0.07*** 0.12** 0.08** 0.06 -0.03 0.07 
Wuhan * Consumer Service * Public Sector    -0.03 0.13*** 0.12*** -0.03 -0.03 0.04 
Wuhan * Consumer Service * Private Sector    -0.09*** 0.38*** 0.30*** -0.07 0.18*** 0.17** 
Wuhan * Other Industries * Public Sector    -0.04 0.09* -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
Wuhan * Other Industries * Private Sector    -0.05 0.67*** 0.02 -0.01 0.50*** -0.05 
Shenyang * Manufacturing * Public Sector    0.11*** 0.17*** 0.05    
Shenyang * Manufacturing * Private Sector    0.10 0.09 0.01 0.02 -0.11 -0.09 
Shenyang * Production Service * Public Sector    -0.03 0.08* 0.05 -0.07 -0.12* 0.02 
Shenyang * Production Service * Private Sector    -0.06* 0.05 0.10** -0.08 -0.19** 0.03 
Shenyang * Consumer Service * Public Sector    0.06* 0.21*** 0.14*** -0.09* -0.04 0.00 
Shenyang * Consumer Service * Private Sector    -0.05 0.26*** 0.21*** -0.17** -0.03 0.03 
Shenyang * Other Industries * Public Sector    0.04 0.12*** 0.12** -0.09 -0.11* 0.03 
Shenyang * Other Industries * Private Sector    0.21** 0.35*** -0.10 0.10 0.09 -0.23** 
Fuzhou * Manufacturing * Public Sector    0.13*** 0.16** -0.02    
Fuzhou * Manufacturing * Private Sector    -0.07** 0.01 0.04 -0.17*** -0.19** 0.01 
Fuzhou * Production Service * Public Sector    -0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.08* -0.16** 0.08 
Fuzhou * Production Service * Private Sector    -0.10*** -0.02 0.01 -0.14** -0.25*** -0.00 
Fuzhou * Consumer Service * Public Sector    -0.01 0.10*** 0.05 -0.18*** -0.14** -0.02 
Fuzhou * Consumer Service * Private Sector    -0.08** 0.08** 0.08** -0.22*** -0.20** -0.03 
Fuzhou * Other Industries * Public Sector    0.03 -0.00 0.04 -0.12** -0.22*** 0.03 
Fuzhou * Other Industries * Private Sector    -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.17** -0.28** -0.08 
Xi’an * Manufacturing * Public Sector    0.02 0.06** -0.00    
Xi’an * Manufacturing * Private Sector    0.11 0.01 0.10 0.11 -0.09* 0.06 
Xi’an * Production Service * Public Sector    0.00 0.07** 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
Xi’an * Production Service * Private Sector    -0.00 0.08* -0.01 0.06 -0.06 -0.03 
Xi’an * Consumer Service * Public Sector    0.04 0.15*** 0.05 -0.02 -0.00 -0.03 
Xi’an * Consumer Service * Private Sector    0.02 0.15*** 0.11*** -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 
Xi’an * Other Industries * Public Sector    0.06* 0.09** -0.04* 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 
Xi’an * Other Industries * Private Sector    0.14 -0.01 -0.05 0.12 -0.18** -0.12 
Constant 0.47*** 0.53*** 0.58*** 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.47*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 
R
2
 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.16 0.09 0.23 0.16 
No. of Observations 4602 4324 6445 4602 4324 6445 4602 4324 6445 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
In 2001 and 2005, average wage of migrant workers was lower than local workers. 
However, in 2010, migrants’ average wage became slightly higher than local workers. As we 
discussed in section 3, the role of market forces is becoming more and more important in 
wage determinations in recent years, due to the lack of migrant workers. However, if we 
consider the differences in social protection between local and migrant workers, we will find 
that the actual income of migrant workers is still lower than local workers. In Table 9, we 
present the differences in social protection between local and migrant workers. 
Table 9 Social Protection of Local and Migrant Workers (%) 
Social Protection 
CULS 1 CULS 2 CULS 3 
Migrant Local Migrant Local Migrant Local 
All 
Pension 6.27 37.45 14.03 73.94 30.03 80.75 
Medical 6.63 37.34 14.96 65.26 32.66 80.30 
Unemployment - - 6.84 32.80 10.40 51.82 
Working Injury - - 12.23 28.42 15.62 40.76 
Minimum Wage Worker 
Pension 5.92 21.23 6.33 63.53 14.65 76.04 
Medical 5.09 18.03 6.84 45.76 19.75 74.15 
Unemployment - - 5.94 17.14 1.93 29.12 
Working Injury - - 6.82 9.09 2.97 16.82 
Non-Minimum Wage Worker 
Pension 6.28 39.05 16.12 75.85 32.05 81.74 
Medical 6.74 39.23 17.25 68.73 34.42 81.39 
Unemployment - - 7.20 35.60 11.28 55.14 
Working Injury - - 13.87 31.83 17.05 44.14 
Note: A minimum wage worker refers to a worker whose wage is equal to or below the official 
minimum wage. A non-minimum wage worker refers to a worker whose wage is above the official 
minimum wage. In CULS 1, information on unemployment and working injury insurance is not 
available. 
 
In general, migrant workers are better covered in terms of social insurance as times 
goes on, although the percentage of covered migrant workers is still lower than local workers. 
Besides, the improvement of social protection for migrant workers is mainly contributed by 
migrant workers who earn above minimum wage, and the proportion of migrant minimum 
wage workers covered by social protection is still very small. In fact, the percentage of 
migrant minimum wage workers covered by unemployment insurance and working injury 
insurance has declined in 2010 compared with 2005. 
Most cities have worth minimum wage coverage than Shanghai. A higher minimum 
wage coverage implies greater efforts by local labor inspection agencies in enforcing 
minimum wage regulation. However, as nominal minimum wages are related to local price 
level, a seemingly high minimum wage doesn’t necessarily represent strong labor market 
interventions by local governments. As a result, the enforcing difficulties of minimum wage 
regulation have no direct connections with nominal minimum wage. In Table 2, Shanghai has 
the highest nominal monthly minimum wage and nominal hourly minimum wage. However, 
if we adjust nominal minimum wage by spatial price indices (SPI), which is proposed by 
Brandt and Holz (2006), to calculate a minimum wage which is comparable among regions, 
then minimum wage in Shanghai is no longer the highest one (Table 10). In 2010, Shenyang 
and Wuhan have higher minimum wage than Shanghai, and as a result, the enforcement is 
more difficult and the coverage rate is lower. 
Table 10 Minimum Wage Standard during the CULS Surveys (SPI Adjusted) 
City 
Monthly Minimum Wage (Yuan/Month) Hourly Minimum Wage (Yuan/Hour) 
2001 2005 2010 2001 2005 2010 
Shanghai 490 665 952 4.00 5.78 7.65 
Wuhan 346 560 959 - 6.09 9.59 
Shenyang 501 572 1008 - 5.09 9.52 
Fuzhou 466 545 825 - 5.27 8.77 
Xi’an 420 626 821 - - 8.21 
Note: “Monthly minimum wage” applies to full-time workers, while “hourly minimum wage” 
applies to part-time workers. “-” indicates that there's no hourly minimum wage during the survey. The 
data in this table has been adjusted by spatial price indices (SPI) proposed by Brandt and Holz (2006), 
using Shanghai in 2001 as the base. 
 
To better understand the enforcement of minimum wage, we also studied the 
relationship between minimum wage and labor disputes (Figure 6). In Figure 6, the horizontal 
axis is the log of comparable minimum wages (adjusted by SPI), and the vertical axis 
represents the percentage of labor disputes cases because of payment in total labor disputes. A 
higher minimum wage is generally related to a higher proportion of labor disputes cases 
because of payment, and a higher minimum wage implies greater enforcing difficulties. 
 
 
Figure 6 Minimum Wage and Labor Disputes 
Source: Minimum wage data is from the China Minimum Wage Database; the minimum wage 
standard has been adjusted by SPI, using Beijing in 1995 as the base. The labor disputes data is from 
China Labor Statistics Yearbook. 
 
Business services are generally high-end services, which include finance, information 
technology and research, etc. As a result, minimum wage coverage in production services is 
generally better than manufacturing industries. Consumer services are generally 
labor-intensive industries, and minimum wage coverage is lower. Minimum wage coverage in 
private sector is better than public sector in 2001, but is worth than public sector since 2005. 
To further study the differences of minimum wage coverages by industry and ownership type, 
we also add in the regression the interaction terms of city, industry and ownership type. It is 
found that in 2001 and 2005, most city dummies are statistically significant, while in 2010 all 
coefficients are no longer significant. These differences indicate that the minimum wage 
enforcement is partially determined by regional factors in earlier years. However, as time goes 
on, once we control the industry and ownership type, the differences in local government 
enforcement no longer exist, which means the stage of economic development and industry 
structure are the main causes of diverse minimum wage coverages across provinces. 
 
4.4 Decomposition of Changes in Minimum Wages Enforcement 
 
In this section, we decomposed the changes in minimum wage coverage using the 
Blinder-Oaxaca method (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). In Table 11, the minimum wage 
coverage decreased from 2001 to 2005, while the coverage increased from 2005 to 2010. We 
decompose these changes into three effects: the endowment effect, the return effect and the 
interaction effect. The endowment effect represents the changes in minimum wage coverage 
because of different sample characteristics in different years. The return effect represents the 
changes in minimum wage coverage because of changes in coefficients of sample 
characteristics in different years. The interaction effect is the changes in minimum wage 
coverage because of changes in both sample characteristics and their coefficients. 
In Table 11, under all three specifications and in all three years, the endowment effects 
are all positive, while the return effects are all negative and the interaction effects are all very 
small. The positive endowment effects imply that better individual, household, regional and 
firm-level characteristics tend to increase minimum wage coverage. The negative return 
effects indicate that the wage return to individual, household, regional and firm-level 
characteristics is declining, and thus can decrease the minimum wage coverage. More 
specifically, from 2001 to 2005, the return effect was greater than the endowment effect, and 
as a result, minimum wage coverage decreased; from 2005 to 2010, the endowment effect was 
greater than return effect, and as a result, minimum wage coverage increased. 
In the endowment effect, human capital has the largest contribution, while the 
contribution of household constraints and regional and firm-level characteristics are very 
small or even negative. In the return effect, although the net effect is negative, the return to 
human capital is still positive and increasing, and the negative return effect is mainly caused 
by the decrease of return to regional and firm-level characteristics, which indicates that the 
differences in wage level and minimum wage coverage caused by household registration, 
region, industry and ownership type tend to decrease. 
Table 11 Decomposition of Changes in Minimum Wage Coverage 
Decomposition 
(1) (2) (3) 
2001-2005 2005-2010 2001-2005 2005-2010 2001-2005 2005-2010 
Specification 
City Y Y N N Y Y 
Industry Y Y N N Y Y 
Ownership Y Y N N Y Y 
Interaction N N Y Y Y Y 
Total 
Group 1 0.0925 0.1422 0.0915 0.1430 0.0925 0.1422 
Group 2 0.1422 0.1139 0.1430 0.1144 0.1422 0.1139 
Differences -0.0497 0.0284 -0.0515 0.0287 -0.0497 0.0284 
Endowment Effect  0.0414 0.0342 0.0250 0.0327 0.0270 0.0326 
Return Effect -0.0699 -0.0070 -0.0732 -0.0141 -0.0722 -0.0150 
Interaction Effect -0.0211 0.0012 -0.0033 0.0101 -0.0044 0.0108 
Endowment Effect 
Human Capital 0.0469 0.0297 0.0422 0.0292 0.0428 0.0287 
Household 0.0023 -0.0008 0.0027 -0.0010 0.0030 -0.0010 
Region and Firm -0.0079 0.0053 -0.0199 0.0045 -0.0188 0.0049 
Return Effect 
Human Capital 0.0938 0.0935 0.0795 0.1049 0.0771 0.0829 
Household 0.0436 -0.0410 0.0344 -0.0362 0.0356 -0.0407 
Region and Firm -0.2073 -0.0595 -0.1870 -0.0827 -0.1849 -0.0573 
Interaction Effect 
Human Capital -0.0264 -0.0001 -0.0217 -0.0012 -0.0214 -0.0003 
Household -0.0064 0.0007 -0.0067 0.0007 -0.0069 0.0007 
Region and Firm 0.0117 0.0006 0.0251 0.0105 0.0238 0.0104 
 
As described above, human capital tends to increase the coverage of minimum wage 
regulation, in terms of both endowment effect and return effect. As a result, by promoting 
education, training and medical services, workers can acquire more return from the labor 




Taking advantage of various sources of data, this paper describes the evolution of 
minimum wage system in China and analyzes its enforcement. In 2010, 13% of workers in 
our sample earn wages below local minimum wages. This result is worse than most of 
developed countries but better than countries with about the same level of economic 
development as China. 
Our analysis indicates that the effect of compliance in minimum wages is not only 
determined by the effort to enforcement, but correlated with many other factors. When the 
demand for labor is robust and labor supply has been more and more constrained by 
demographic transition, wages for unskilled workers have been growing rapidly. In this case, 
the difficulty of enforcement reduces due to the spontaneous forces in the labor market. In 
addition, more regulated labor market institutions, like the Employment Contract Law, 
facilitate to enforcement the minimum wage. 
Using urban household survey data, this paper examines the coverage of minimum 
wage. Both descriptive statistics and regression analysis indicate that some focused groups of 
workers ought to be targeted when implementing the minimum wages, including female and 
less educated workers. Meanwhile, the significant disparity in returns to human capital 
implies that in the long run improving job quality is the fundamental means to better 
enforcement. 
The empirical analysis in this paper also indicates that the variation of enforcement 
might simply put in nutshell of different effort in enforcement among regions. Controlled for 
individual characteristics, we do find that in early period the coastal cities had better 
performance in compliance of minimum wage. But the most recent data also indicate that the 
regional disparity would disappear if the ownership and economic structure of the regions are 
controlled. This implies that the difference in economic structure and development could give 
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